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Almost all macroeconomic indicators change upon shocks inﬂ  uenced by the glo-
bal ﬁ  nancial crisis that has also spilled over to the public sector, seriously threa-
tening ﬁ  scal sustainability. The aim of this paper is to estimate public debt sustai-
nability in the crisis and post-crisis period from 2011 to 2015. For estimation of 
public debt movements, decomposition of basic ﬂ  ows that lead to its change will 
be considered, and each one will be separately modeled dynamically. It is shown 
that in the period up to 2015 the share of public debt in GDP in optimistic scena-
rios does not exceed the margin of 60%, prescribed by the Maastricht criteria. In 
baseline scenarios we get two-sided results, so in the ﬁ  rst model public debt sli-
ghtly exceeds the limit of 60% with a share of 62.6% of GDP in 2015, while in all 
other baseline scenarios public debt stays at the level of 45.8, or 52.5% of GDP. 
Therefore, we conclude that in the medium-term period up to 2015 there is a real 
danger of public debt increasing over its acceptable limit and the major threats lie 
in contingent liabilities and exchange rate shocks, while minor vulnerability can 
be observed in case of real GDP growth and nominal interest rate shocks.
Keywords: public debt, ﬁ  scal sustainability, dynamic models, deﬁ  cit, stock-ﬂ  ow 
adjustment, the Croatian economy
1 INTRODUCTION 
The global ﬁ  nancial crisis that started on the subprime mortgage loans market in 
the United States of America in the second half of 2007 has showed that a sufﬁ  -
ciently strong external shock (in this case the shock of defaulted mortgage loans 
in the USA) can contagiously spread to sectors and institutions that were strongly 
indebted in the previous cycle. There are ﬁ  ve main mechanisms through which the 
crisis spreads, and these are: direct real channel initiated by a ﬁ  nancial accelera-
tor/decelerator, banking balance channel (losses channel), interest rate channel, 
ﬁ  scal channel and complexity channel. The ﬁ  rst relation within the ﬁ  scal channel 
– public revenue decline, has had a strong negative effect in Croatia, while all 
other relations within the ﬁ  scal channel that have short-term positive effects on 
economic activity have not occurred. The negative effect of deﬁ  cit widening, rai-
sing the question of its sustainability, has probably been intensiﬁ  ed by the com-
plexity channel (Croatian Banking Association, 2010a).
The main theme of this paper is the effects of the ﬁ  scal crisis that have come out 
of the global ﬁ  nancial crisis and been manifested in the serious destabilization of 
public ﬁ  nance. If some country faced deﬁ  cits even before the crisis, it is quite 
probable that during the crisis it would be unable to hold the level of the deﬁ  cit 
below the limit of 3%, prescribed by the Maastricht criterion. Almost at the same 
time all other indicators that have effect on public debt increase record negative 
trends, putting an additional pressure on the level of country’s indebtedness. The-
refore most countries in times of crisis record signiﬁ  cant growth of the share of 








































































































































415 exceeding the public debt sustainability level, which means that the debt starts to 
rise faster than the debtor’s ability to pay it off.
Testing the sustainability of the Croatian public debt is the basic aim of this paper 
and the main hypothesis tested is that the share of public debt in GDP up to 2015 
will stay below the limit of 60%, at which it can be considered acceptable accor-
ding to the Maastricht criterion. The analytical background of the Maastricht con-
vergence criterion is very simple, implying that any debt exceeding the limit of 
60% should converge to the target level of 60% of GDP in the long run, but with 
the assumption of annual nominal GDP growth of 5% and of keeping the level of 
deﬁ  cit below the level of 3%. Besides that, the analytics are based on the assump-
tion that the level of public debt between two points in time changes only by the 
realized deﬁ  cit in that period, which differs from the reality (Gros, 2003). Accor-
ding to the Budget Act (Zakon o proračunu, NN 87/08), the upper limit of the 
government debt at the end of the year should not be higher than 60% of the GDP1. 
Still, there are many studies that oppose the referentiality of the deﬁ  ned public 
debt level of 60% of GDP, stressing that the limit of sustainability of public debt 
in developed and emerging markets may signiﬁ  cantly differ, which implies poten-
tially unsustainable public debt on even lower levels than that prescribed by the 
Maastricht criterion (see for instance IMF, 2003a or Croatian Banking Associa-
tion, 2010b).
To test the hypothesis of the sustainability of the Croatian public debt in the me-
dium-term period up to 2015, we will use dynamic models with the decomposi-
tion of the debt changes to basic measurable debt-creating ﬂ  ows. This gives rise to 
logical questions such as: which variables have a signiﬁ  cant impact on the move-
ments of the public debt, how will the current ﬁ  nancial crisis affect the move-
ments of those variables, what do we expect in future and what will happen in the 
event of additional stress from one or several variables? The answers to these 
questions may help us in drawing conclusions about the sustainability of the Croa-
tian public debt up to 2015.
This paper is organised as follows: after the introduction, the second part of the 
paper considers the estimated impact of the crisis on ﬁ  scal indicators, comparison 
with the actual data and a theoretical overview of potential implications. In the 
third part, projections of the Croatian primary budget balance in three basic sce-
narios are made and in the fourth part we quantify and project other variables that 
have an effect on the change of the public debt. The ﬁ  fth part deals with different 
1 Government debt is defined as the debt of the central budget, while public debt means the debt of general 
government. Still, the Budget Act defines conditions and limits for the indebtedness of local and regional self-
government units in a way that a long-term borrowing is acceptable only for investments that are financed 
from their budget and in case when total annual liability of a local and regional self-government unit amounts 
to maximum 20% of gained revenue in a year that preceded the year in which it gets into debt (Zakon o 
proračunu, NN 87/08). Therefore, the level of public debt is mainly determined by the level of government 
debt. At the end of 2010, the government debt amounted to 40.5% of GDP, while the public debt amounted to 








































































































































416 dynamic model projections of the public debt and tests its sustainability in the 
period up to 2015. This is followed by a conclusion. 
2 FISCAL INDICATORS IN TIMES OF CRISIS
A ﬁ  nancial (banking) crisis can be deﬁ  ned in several different ways. According to 
Laeven and Valencia (2009), a crisis can be deﬁ  ned as various episodes in which 
the ﬁ  nancial and corporate sectors of individual states face major difﬁ  culties with 
the timely payment and collectability of their agreed debts, a signiﬁ  cant increase 
in the number of unused loans and the exhaustion of most of the capital of the 
banking system. Financial crises mainly occur in developing markets, but they 
also affect other markets. Therefore, even more developed countries such as EU 
or OECD member states can feel a crisis (Laeven and Valencia, 2009).
In times of crisis public ﬁ  nance inevitably face serious destabilization. Decline in 
economic activity is often connected to unemployment and retirement rate increa-
ses, which bring increased expenditure from the government budget in the form of 
social beneﬁ  ts, aids and different subsidies. At the same time, revenues from inco-
me tax and contributions decrease, which negatively affects the revenue side of 
the budget. On the other hand, negative trends on the labour market and uncerta-
inty of future economic trends make people spend their money rationally, which 
consequentially leads, together with the above-mentioned growth of the unem-
ployment, to private consumption decrease, i.e. to lower revenues of indirect taxes 
(value added tax and excise). Lower private consumption also means lower pro-
duction needs, which implies a decrease in proﬁ  t tax revenue, but also an additio-
nal decline in economic activity, growth in unemployment, etc. It is clear that such 
a sequence of causal connections (in this case simpliﬁ  ed) can very easily get out 
of control and lead to spiral effects with catastrophic proportions.
Financial crises are not an unknown term in public ﬁ  nance and there are many 
ﬁ  ndings from the literature about the effect of ﬁ  nancial crises on ﬁ  scal indicators. 
Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) analyzed crisis periods in 66 developed and emerging 
markets and concluded that banking crises dramatically weaken ﬁ  scal positions in 
all countries with government revenues invariably contracting and ﬁ  scal expendi-
tures often expanding sharply. Three years after a ﬁ  nancial crisis, central govern-
ment debt increases, on average, by about 86 percent. Laeven and Valencia (2008) 
showed that during 40 observed crisis episodes monetary policy tended to be fair-
ly neutral, while the ﬁ  scal stance tended to be expansive, arguably to support the 
ﬁ  nancial and real sectors, and to accommodate bank restructuring and debt re-
structuring programs. On average, the ﬁ  scal balance was about -3.6 percent of 
GDP during the initial years of a banking crisis. Fiscal costs, net of recoveries, 
associated with crisis management can be substantial, averaging about 13.3 per-
cent of GDP on average and can be as high as 55.1 percent of GDP. The European 
Commission (2009) in its empirical analysis of the effects of previous crises on 








































































































































417 of them in EU-27 and OECD member countries, the average duration of the crisis 
being four and a half years. Table 1 shows total revenue and expenditure before 
and after the crisis.
TABLE 1
Total revenue and expenditure before and after the crisis (% of GDP) 
 



































EU-27 41.0 40.1 -0.9 42.7 43.8 1.1 -1.7 -3.7 -2.0
EU-15 45.4 45.9 0.5 42.2 51.7 9.5 3.2 -5.8 -9.0
OECD 36.4 35.8 -0.6 38.7 41.0 2.3 -2.3 -5.2 -2.9
OECD 
and EU
33.8 34.1 0.3 36.4 38.3 1.9 -2.6 -4.2 -1.6
Other 25.2 25.6 0.4 27.3 27.9 0.6 -2.1 -2.3 -0.2
Average 36.4 36.3 -0.1 37.5 40.5 3.1 -1.1 -4.2 -3.1
Source: European Commission (2009).
Data from table 1 indicate that revenue on average were slightly reduced, whilst 
expenditure in all considered groups increased and the average increase was about 
3.1% of GDP. The change of the budget balance from the year before the begin-
ning to the year of the end of the crisis amounted to -3.1 percentage points on 
average, but it is interesting that the greatest difference was found in the EU-15 
budget balance, amounting to as much as 9 percentage points.
Sopek (2010) in a parallel analysis observed the new EU member states and the 
EU and Euro zone average in the middle of the current global ﬁ  nancial crisis and 
emphasizes that the highest deﬁ  cit increase can be noted in 2009 in almost all 
observed countries, which is a consequence of the expansion of the crisis. Table 2 
shows budget balance and public debt actual data as shares in GDP in 2007 (pre-
crisis period), preliminary estimation for 2010 (crisis period) and forecast for 
2012 (post-crisis period) for Croatia, the new EU member states (EU-10) and the 









































































































































Actual data and projections of the budget balance and public debt (% of GDP)

















Croatia -1.0 -4.4 -3.4 -4.4 -3.4 33.2 41.2 8.0 41.2 49.9
EU-27 av. -0.9 -6.8 -5.9 -6.8 -4.2 58.8 79.1 20.3 79.1 83.3
Slovenia 0.0 -5.8 -5.8 -5.8 -4.7 23.4 40.7 17.3 40.7 47.6
Hungary -5.0 -3.8 1.2 -9.3 -6.2 66.1 78.5 12.4 78.5 81.6
Slovakia -1.8 -8.2 -6.4 -8.2 -5.0 29.6 42.1 12.5 43.4 47.4
Czech R. -0.7 -5.2 -4.6 -6.8 -4.2 29.0 40.0 11.0 40.0 45.2
Poland -1.9 -7.9 -6.1 -7.9 -6.0 45.0 55.5 10.6 55.5 59.6
Estonia 2.5 -1.0 -3.6 -2.8 -2.7 3.7 8.0 4.3 8.0 11.7
Bulgaria 1.1 -3.8 -5.0 -4.7 -1.8 17.2 18.2 0.9 52.4 20.8
Romania -2.6 -7.3 -4.7 -8.6 -3.5 12.6 30.4 17.8 30.4 34.1
Latvia -0.3 -7.7 -7.4 -10.2 -7.3 9.0 45.7 36.7 45.7 56.6
Lithuania -1.0 -8.4 -7.3 -9.2 -6.9 16.9 37.4 20.5 37.4 48.3
est. – preliminary estimation; f. – projection
Source: AMECO database; Ministry of Finance.
Column minimum 2002-10 indicates the lowest realized budget balance as a per-
centage of GDP in the period from 2002 to 2010. It is shown that most countries 
reached minimum budget balance, i.e. the highest deﬁ  cit in crisis years, that is, in 
2009 and 2010. Column maximum 2002-10 indicates the highest recorded public 
debt to GDP ratio in the period from 2002 to 2010 and it is shown that almost all 
countries recorded the highest level of public debt as a percentage of GDP in 2010. 
Only Slovakia and Bulgaria had recorded the highest debt to GDP ratio in some 
earlier periods (in 2002), after which it decreased drastically up to 2008 (AMECO 
database). Columns noted as change 2007-10 indicate total change of share of bu-
dget balance and public debt in GDP from pre-crisis period to crisis period. Croatia 
has had a lower negative change of budget balance in the period from 2007 to 2010 
than the other observed countries. Only Hungary, the only country that managed to 
record a positive change of the budget balance in the observed period, had a better 
result than Croatia. However, while all the other observed countries expect positive 
movements up to 2012 with regard to 2010, Hungary and Estonia are the only 
countries that expect an additional deterioration of the budget balance. The share 








































































































































419 ts2. Additional concerns raise a projection that forecasts an increase of the public 
debt to almost 50% of GDP by the end of 2012 in a baseline scenario. According 
to that indicator in 2010, Croatia is situated roughly in the middle among the ob-
served countries with a lower level of public debt than Hungary and Poland, but a 
much higher level than Estonia and Bulgaria.
According to the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which relates to all EU mem-
ber states, there are two ﬁ  scal criteria prescribed that these countries deﬁ  nitely 
must comply with. These are deﬁ  cit below the limit of 3% of GDP and ratio of 
public debt to GDP of below 60%. In the event of the violation of one of these two 
criteria, the Excessive Deﬁ  cit Procedure (EDP), which deﬁ  nes guidelines and dea-
dlines for the gradual stabilization of public ﬁ  nance (Eur-Lex, 2008a; 2008b), will 
be initiated. If some country faced deﬁ  cits even before the crisis, it is almost cer-
tain that it will not be able to hold the level of deﬁ  cit below the limit of 3% of GDP 
in times of crisis. This is exactly what happened to almost all EU-27 member 
states in the current ﬁ  nancial crisis, only Estonia and Sweden being exempted 
from EDP (European Commission, 2011).
During the global ﬁ  nancial crisis, most countries recorded a considerable rise in 
the public debt to GDP ratio. IMF (2010) represents the level of public debt with 
probability density function by analyzing the debt level in 41 emerging markets in 
2007 and 2010, which gives a clear comparable picture of debt movements in 
different years. Figure 1 shows probability density function of public debt to GDP 
ratio in 2007, 2010 and 2012 estimated on actual data and projections for 32 coun-
tries in the AMECO database (European Commission, 2010).
Probability density function from the ﬁ  gure is estimated by a non-parametric ker-
nel method with chosen normal (Gauss) kernel function and with limitation of 
non-negativity of the public debt3. Data include 32 European countries from the 
AMECO database, all EU-27 member states, four acceding countries (Turkey, 
Croatia, Macedonia and Iceland) and Norway. It is shown that the average share 
of public debt in GDP rose from 42.3% in 2007 to an estimated 59.5% in 2010 and 
an additional increase of the public debt to 64.3% of GDP in 2012 is expected. 
Similar conclusion can be drawn from a probability density function constructed 
from the IMF data (IMF, 2010), which shows an obvious and worrying trend of 
public debt increase in crisis periods.
2 According to the Budget Act (Zakon o proračunu, NN 87/08), public debt or the debt of the public sector 
from 1 January 2009 comprises the debt of general government, which no longer includes the so-called 
contingent debt in the form of financial and performance guarantees issued, and the debt of Croatian Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR). Transactions of Croatian Motorways (HAC) were also been 
excluded from general government with the budget rebalance for 2008, as a result of the harmonization with 
the European statistical methodology ESA 95, and are categorized in a subsector of public non-financial 
enterprises. Therefore, HAC transactions are no longer recorded within the general government sector.









































































































































A high level of public debt has several adverse long-term economic consequences 
like the increase of long-term interest rates (Baldacci and Kumar, 2010), future 
distortionary taxation and the impossibility of monetary policy independence 
(Piergallini and Rodano, 2009). Also, high debt may limit space for countercycli-
cal ﬁ  scal policies, which can result in higher volatility and lower growth, and can 
also increase vulnerability to crises (IMF, 2010). Kumar and Woo (2010) showed 
by an econometric analysis that higher initial public debt level is related to lower 
subsequent economic growth. On average, a 10 percentage points increase in the 
initial debt to GDP ratio is associated with a slowdown in annual real per capita 
GDP growth of around 0.2 percentage points per year, with the impact being so-
mewhat smaller in advanced economies. The authors (Kumar and Woo, 2010) also 
stressed that there is some evidence of nonlinearity of this relationship, implying 
that higher levels of initial debt have a proportionately larger negative effect on 
subsequent growth.
3 PROJECTIONS OF THE CROATIAN PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCE
In analytical overviews of the public debt stock, it is often possible to observe a 
simple equation describing debt level with public debt stock at the end of previous 
year, realized deﬁ  cit and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment that comprises all other ﬂ  ows (see 
for instance Hagen and Wolff, 2004 or Campos, Jaimovich and Panizza, 2006). 
This can be shown with the following expression: 
  Dt = Dt–1 – (Bt
p– Kt) + St (1)
FIGURE 1 
Probability density function of public debt in 2007, 2010 and 2012 (% of GDP)
Source: AMECO database; author’s calculation.
Public debt (% of GDP)





























































































































































421 where Dt denotes nominal debt stock at the end of year t, Bt
p realized primary bu-
dget balance, Kt the amount of interest expense, and St stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment in 
year t. For our analytical purposes, we need a relevant share in GDP of speciﬁ  c 
variables, so it is necessary to transform the equation (1), which is shown with the 
following expression:




⋅ dt – 1 – (bt
p – kt ) + st  (2)
where dt denotes the share of public debt in GDP at the end of year t, gt
N nominal 
GDP growth rate, bt
p primary budget balance of the general government, kt share 
of interest expense on the outstanding public debt, and st stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment as 
a percentage of the GDP in year t. 
The basic aim of this part of the paper is to construct projections of the Croatian 
primary budget balance, after which we will model the effect of other measurable 
variables from the equation (2) in the next part of the paper. For the purpose of 
projections of Croatian primary balance movements, as well as the other key va-
riables, we deﬁ  ne three scenarios: baseline, optimistic and pessimistic4. Since we 
decided to choose three different scenarios, we assume that there is no need for the 
estimation of conﬁ  dence intervals, for any deviations from the baseline scenario 
will be covered by the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios.
If there is a new crisis wave, it is very probable that the weakened economy will 
record new downfalls, so we may assume that the Croatian primary balance will 
change its trend again. In other words, the less likely and extremely unfavourable 
pessimistic scenario up to 2015 can be described with the same function as in 
Sopek (2009), which is shown with the following equation:
fpes (t) = f (t) = –0.5726 – 1.2824(t – 2008.5) – 0.1364(t – 2008.5)2
                       + 0.0923(t – 2008.5)3 + 0.0104(t – 2008.5)4 – 0.003(t – 2008.5)5 
(3)
where t∈ [2006, 2015] denotes the time mark in years and f(t) function of move-
ments of primary budget balance in crisis and post-crisis periods. Function (3) is 
a polynomial of the ﬁ  fth degree obtained by a regression analysis based on histo-
rical experiences of the effect of crisis in EU-12 member states and afterwards 
adjusted to Croatian data5. Since the observed function changes the trend from rise 
to fall after 2013, it can be useful in this form only as a formulation of a pessimi-
stic scenario.
4 Baseline scenario actually means baseline medium-term projection, i.e. the movements of variables expected 
in expected economic conditions. On the other hand, optimistic and pessimistic scenarios mean equivalent 
movements in favourable, i.e. adverse economic conditions.
5 The method of projection of the primary budget balance in Sopek (2009) is mainly founded on statistical 
estimates, since the author considers most macroeconomic variables as exogenous. It also has to be mentioned 
that in this projection the considered function is chosen exclusively in order to satisfy local characteristics, 
i.e. theoretical assumptions on the movements of primary balance are satisfied up to 2013, which was the 








































































































































422 The baseline scenario is formed with assumption that the impact of crisis will 
leave long-term consequences on the ﬁ  scal system and that it will need several 
years for the system to stabilize. In other words, economic recovery, and therewith 
the recovery of the general government primary balance, will be slower than its 
initial decline upon the global ﬁ  nancial crisis. The function of the movements of 
Croatian primary budget balance in baseline scenario is separated in two parts, 
from 2010 to 2013 (polynomial of the ﬁ  fth degree) and from 2013 to 2015 (linear 
function), which can be expressed with the following equation: 
fbase (t) =
                            f (t)                          : for t∈ [2006, 2013] 
(4)
               { f (2013) + f’ (2013) ⋅ (t – 2013)   : for t∈ [2013, 2015]
where f’ (2013) represents derivative of the function f(t) at the point t = 2013, and 
all other marks stay the same as before. The linear function that describes the 
movements of the primary budget balance in the period 2013-2015 is actually 
tangent of the function f at the point t = 2013. Such a deﬁ  ned baseline scenario is 
in accordance with the theoretical ﬁ  ndings of the effect of crisis on ﬁ  scal balance, 
which was elaborated in the previous section of this paper. 
IMF (2011a) in its medium-term outlook up to 2016 also predicts a gradual de-
crease of deﬁ  cit levels (and accordingly primary deﬁ  cit levels) in most countries. 
Deﬁ  cit reduction in advanced economies will slow in 2013 and largely cease in 
2014, leaving deﬁ  cits above pre-crisis levels in several of them. IMF predictions 
show that most advanced and emerging economies may record deﬁ  cit levels in 
2016 similar to those prior to the crisis. These ﬁ  ndings justify the function choice 
for the movements of the Croatian primary balance in the baseline scenario.
With the assumption that Croatian ﬁ  scal policy will show decisiveness and mana-
ge to start the economy, we may suppose a more optimistic scenario than the one 
in baseline projection. In this case, we construct function of the Croatian primary 
balance movements from 2013 to 2015 as slightly convex function in such a way 
that in 2015 it reaches same level of function f as in 2006, which is its local maxi-
mum in the period 2006-13. This will be modeled by adding a quadratic term to 
the linear trend from the expression (4), which can be expressed with the fol-
lowing formula: 
                                                      f (t)                                   : for t∈ [2006, 2013] 
(5) fopt (t) = { f (2013) + f’ (2013) ⋅ (t – 2013) + α ⋅ (t – 2013)2 : for t∈ [2013, 2015] 
where 
f (2006) – f (2013)
(2015 – 2013)2 α =  denotes a coefﬁ  cient of the translated quadratic term and 
all other marks stay the same as before. Such a function choice ensures that fopt in 








































































































































423 It is very important to stress that all three scenarios of the movements of the Croa-
tian primary budget balance described with the above mentioned functions are 
technically constructed in such a way as to meet local conditions up to 2015. In 
case of longer-term projections one should deﬁ  nitely avoid such a method for se-
veral already discussed reasons. A graphic preview of the primary balance move-
ments of general government in the period 2006-15 in all three deﬁ  ned scenarios 
and the actual data in the period 2006-10 are shown in ﬁ  gure 2.
FIGURE 2 
Projections of the primary budget balance for the period 2006-15 in three diffe-
rent scenarios (% of GDP)
Source: Ministry of Finance; author’s calculation.
In the baseline scenario, the primary budget deﬁ  cit in 2015 will amount to 0.49% 
of GDP, in the pessimistic scenario it will amount to 5.57% of GDP, while in the 
optimistic scenario a primary budget surplus of 1.04% of GDP will be produced. 
The period 2013-15 brings huge uncertainties which will be reﬂ  ected on the gene-
ral government budget, since Croatia should become the member of the European 
Union on the 1st of July 2013. Actual data of the all costs of EU accession are not 
publicly available and the existing research does not give concrete answers. 
However, the accession process leads to a negative net ﬁ  scal impact on general 
government budget, which varies depending on the degree of harmonization and 
can amount to up to 3% of GDP in the ﬁ  rst years after member status is obtained 
(Antczak, 2003). Sopek (2011) in a detailed analysis of ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows estimates 
the short-term effect of EU accession on Croatian budget of -0.15% of GDP. In the 
pessimistic scenario, the negative effect on the Croatian budget will be as much as 
-1.24% of GDP, while in the optimistic scenario the effect is positive and amo  unts 
to 1.07% of GDP. These results justify deviations of three deﬁ  ned projections of 
the Croatian primary budget balance movements.





















































































































































424 4 SOURCES OF PUBLIC DEBT CHANGES 
A decrease in a primary budget balance directly affects changes of public sector 
debt. Nevertheless, for the country’s indebtedness, except primary deﬁ  cit there are 
other economic indicators that may directly or indirectly inﬂ  uence changes in the 
debt. One of the most important is deﬁ  nitely the gross domestic product (GDP) of 
observed country, i.e. its annual change, since GDP growth acts like an automatic 
stabilizer of the share of public debt in GDP, which can be clearly seen from equa-
tion (2). Aizenman and Jinjarak (2011) stated that the higher projected growth rate 
implies that the ﬂ  ow costs of public debt are lower, increasing their ﬁ  scal space. 
Besides GDP, interest rates on public debt stock and exchange rate changes, acti-
vation of government liabilities etc. may also have an important role in public debt 
movements.
For modeling GDP growth we will use a simple formula that dynamically projects 
real GDP growth based on the historical average and that produced in the previous 
year, which can be expressed with the following formula:
  gt = k ⋅ gt – 1 + (1 – k) ⋅ ˉ g (6)
where gt denotes real GDP growth in the year t, ˉ g average GDP growth in the ob-
served period, and k∈ [0, 1] the weighted factor of the importance of real GDP 
growth recorded in the previous year with regard to the historical average. The 
higher this weighted factor is (i.e. closer to 1), the bigger attention is dedicated to 
realized GDP growth in the previous year. For the average annual GDP growth 
rate we will use the average of the period of stable GDP growth from 2002 to 
2007, amounting to 4.5% (CBS, 2011a). A question arises as to how to choose the 
optimal weighted factor. Figure 3 shows projections of the real GDP growth rate 
in seven different variations of the choice of weighted factor.
As in primary budget balance projections, for GDP projections we will also use 
three different scenarios. A weighted factor of 0.6 best matches the real GDP 
growth in baseline scenario and is compliant with actual estimations of the GDP 
growth for 2011 at the moment of writing this paper, which predicts real GDP 
growth between 1 and 1.3 percent (see for instance CNB, 2011a and EIZ, 2011), 
while in 2012 it should amount to approximately 2.4 percent (EIZ, 2011). The 
pessimistic scenario can be imagined as gradual, but extremely slow economy 
recovery, in which the major part of real GDP movements is determined by last 
year’s realized GDP, which would correspond to a weighted factor of 0.8. The 
optimistic scenario assumes a relatively fast economy recovery, which will be 
described by a weighted factor of 0.4. Such a choice of weighted factors is nearly 
equal to deviations from the baseline scenario for two standard deviations of the 
period 2000-07 (CBS, 2011), which actually makes sense taking into account the 
relatively low probability of individual shocks higher than two standard devia-








































































































































425 3 percent (IMF, 2002). For projections of the nominal GDP growth, it is necessary 
to correct real GDP growth by the inﬂ  ation rate. The Institute of Economics from 
Zagreb (2011) predicts an inﬂ  ation rate of 2.7% in 2011 and 2.9% in 2012. For 
further projections we assume a stable inﬂ  ation rate in the whole period from 2013 
to 2015 of 3% annually, which corresponds to the average inﬂ  ation rate of the 
period 2000-10 measured by consumer price index (CBS, 2011b).
FIGURE 3 
Projections of the real GDP growth for the period 2010-15 in addition to weighted 
factor choice
Source: Author’s calculation.

















For the movements of interest rates on public debt we will use historical data of 
the period 2002-10, shown in the table 3.
TABLE 3
Interest expense and nominal interest rates on public debt
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426 Average nominal interest rates on public debt are calculated as a nominal amount 
of interest expense on the consolidated general government level in some year and 
divided by the public debt stock of the general government at the end of previous 
year. Average nominal interest rate on public debt in the period 2002-10 amounts 
to 5.4% and has recorded an increase from 4.8% in 2008 to 5.6% annually in 
2010. For the movements of nominal interest rates up to 2015 we may assume a 
slight linear increase to 6% in the baseline scenario, a bit sharper increase to 7.5% 
in the pessimistic scenario and a decrease to 4.5% in the optimistic scenario. A 
good argument for baseline scenario so deﬁ  ned, with a higher average interest rate 
than recorded in 2010, is that the last 3 bonds issued in 2010, i.e. Series 13 (D-20), 
Series 14 (D-20) and Series 15 (D-17), were issued with interest rates from 6.25%-
6.75% (Ministry of Finance, 2010), which is over 1 percentage point higher than 
the average of period 2002-10. From familiar nominal interest rates (label it), the 
share of interest expense in GDP can be easily calculated, which is shown with the 
following expression:
              
kt =
     it
           1 + gt
N .
  dt –1
 
(7)
Sopek (2009) ﬁ  nds a correlation between the variables Croatian primary deﬁ  cit 
and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment (SFA) and emphasizes that in years in which primary 
deﬁ  cit has been recorded, stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment has been mainly positive and 
vice versa. Stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment depends on many exogenous variables, mainly 
connected to market trends. Therefore in hard times, apart from negative budget 
balances being recorded, more government liabilities may be activated (e.g. gua-
rantees), domestic currency is more likely to depreciate, the state is forced to re-
capitalize ﬁ  rms in trouble, etc. Such conditions lead to a rise in stock-ﬂ  ow adjust-
ment and accordingly to an increase in public debt. Theoretically, this indicator 
should tend to be cancelled over time, while if the opposite is true, this may indi-
cate constant inappropriate recording of budgetary operations and can lead large 
ex-post upward revisions of deﬁ  cit levels (Hagen and Wolff, 2004).
In this paper we will use similar method of stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment projections as 
in Sopek (2009), but it will be modeled in relation to budget balance, instead of 
primary budget balance. However, the analysis based on which we build our as-
sumptions contains a time series of only 9 years, which may be considered insuf-
ﬁ  cient for performing quality analysis and it is not quite clear if these results may 
be considered conﬁ  dent and applicable or just a random outcome. Furthermore, in 
2008 Croatian Motorways (HAC) was excluded from general government, as a 
result of the harmonization with the ESA 95 methodology, so there is a small in-
consistency in the observed time series. Scatter plot of the Croatian budget balan-
ce and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment with estimated regression line and 95% conﬁ  dence 








































































































































427 FIGURE 4 
Scatter plot of the Croatian deﬁ  cit and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment and regression line 
with 95% conﬁ  dence intervals
Source: Author’s calculation.
Linear regression model shows a relatively satisfactory ﬁ  t measured by determi-
nation coefﬁ  cient (R2 statistics) of 72% and adjusted determination coefﬁ  cient of 
68%. For the purpose of baseline scenario we will observe a variant of stock-ﬂ  ow 
adjustment, which will be modeled by the estimated regression line expressed 
from historical data of the period 2002-10. This regression line can be expressed 
with a following formula:
 s t = – 0.95 . bt – 2.14  (8)
We can model optimistic and pessimistic scenario with lines that correspond to 
boundaries of 95% conﬁ  dence intervals, which is actually just a vertical shift of 
the equation (8) by 1.51 downwards in the optimistic scenario, or upwards in the 
pessimistic scenario.
From ﬁ  gure 4 it is easy to note a strong negative correlation of Croatian budget 
balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment in the period 2002-10. However, we are inte-
rested if a similar relation can be perceived among data of some other countries. 
Figure 5 shows a scatter plot of budget balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment (% of 
GDP) for EU-10 member states for the period 2002-10.
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428 FIGURE 5 
Scatter plot of budget balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment for EU-10 member sta-
tes for the period 2002-10 (% of GDP)
Source: AMECO database; author’s calculation.
It is obvious that a similar relation of budget balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment 
cannot be noticed in new EU member states data, where the slope of a line has an 
opposite sign from the slope of the regression line estimated from Croatian data. 
Besides that, the associated linear regression model shows extremely unsati-
sfactory model ﬁ  t of just 1.3%, measured by the determination coefﬁ  cient. 
Since the relation of budget balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment identiﬁ  ed in Croa-
tian data cannot be noticed in EU-10 member states data, the given results should 
be observed and interpreted with caution. Therefore, as well as testing the sustai-
nability of public debt with the model that includes stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment, we will 
use the well known dynamic model (see for instance IMF, 2003b; Babić et al., 
2003), which decomposes annual public debt changes to four basic debt-creating 
ﬂ  ows, and these are: (1) primary budget balance; (2) automatic debt dynamics; 
(3) other identiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows; (4) residual (unidentiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows). 
Automatic debt dynamics explain debt changes that happen outside the ﬁ  scal 
sphere, i.e. changes of real interest rate, real GDP growth and nominal exchange 
rate. According to IMF (2003b), total automatic debt dynamics in year t can be 
described with the following expression:
Budget balance (% of GDP)
























































































































































































429 rt –  t (1 + gt) – gt + (1 + rt) αt – 1 εt
(1 + gt) (1 +  t) at =  · dt – 1
    
rt –  t (1 + gt)
(1 + gt) (1 +  t) =  · dt – 1 +
– gt
(1 + gt) (1 +  t) · dt – 1
 (9)
   
(1 + rt)
(1 + gt) (1 +  t) +  · αt – 1 · εt · dt – 1
where α denotes share of public debt in foreign currency, ε nominal exchange rate 
change, r real interest rate, g real GDP growth, π annual inﬂ  ation rate, and d, the 
same as before, debt stock at the end of observed period. First addend in formula 
(9) denotes contribution of the real interest rate, the second one contribution of 
real GDP growth and the last one the contribution of the exchange rate change to 
the increase in the debt. 
Other identiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows comprise privatization receipts and recognized implicit and 
explicit contingent liabilities of the government, which consist of different contin-
gent, i.e. potential liabilities that contribute to public debt increase upon activation, 
i.e. if a particular event occurs. Explicit contingent liabilities comprise different state 
guarantees recognized by law or contract, such as: guarantees for non-sovereign bor-
rowings and obligations issued to sub-national governments and public and private 
sector entities; umbrella state guarantees for various types of loans (such as for mor-
tgages, students studying agriculture, and small businesses); state guarantees (for 
trade and the exchange rate borrowing by a foreign sovereign state, private invest-
ments); state insurance schemes (for deposits, minimum retu rns from private pension 
funds, crops, ﬂ  oods, war risk), etc. Implicit contingent liabilities are a “moral” obli-
gation of the government that mainly reﬂ  ects public expectations and pressures by 
some interest groups. These liabilities include: default of a sub-national government 
and public or private entity on nonguaranteed debt and other liabilities; cleanup of 
the liabilities of privatized entities; bank failure (beyond state insurance); investment 
failure of a nonguaranteed pension fund, employment fund, or social security fund 
(social protection of small investors); default of the central bank on its obligations 
(foreign exchange contracts, currency defense, balance of payments stability); bai-
louts following a reversal in private capital ﬂ  ows; residual environmental damage, 
disaster relief, military ﬁ  nancing, etc. (Polackova, 1998).
If the debt change cannot be explained with these variables, there must be some 
unidentiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows (residual) present. These are debt-creating ﬂ  ows that can be 
considered statistical errors or mistakes in the debt and debt-creating ﬂ  ows ac-
counts. This ﬂ  ow is particularly of our interest, since it shows the real quality of 
the model, which we rely on. 
According to IMF (2003b) the change of public debt in this dynamic model can be 
described with the following equation:
 d t – dt – 1 = – bt
p + at + (– rt








































































































































430 where dt denotes public debt, bt
p primary budget balance, at automatic debt dynamics 
expressed from formula (9), rt
priv privatization receipts, lt recognized implicit and 
explicit contingent liabilities of the government and  εt unidentiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows (residual) 
in a speciﬁ  c moment of time t, where all variables are expressed as shares in GDP. 
Values of all projected variables in baseline scenario are shown in table 5 in the next 
part of the paper. Expected projections of the primary budget balance, real GDP 
growth, inﬂ  ation rate and nominal interest rate are taken from the previously deﬁ  ned 
baseline scenarios. For projections of implicit and explicit contingent liabilities of 
the government and privatization receipts, we will use IMF (2011b) projections. 
In a press release of the Croatian National Bank (2011b) it is stated that given the 
high level of euroization and large dependence of the Croatian economy on im-
ports, the maintenance of the stability of the exchange rate of the kuna against the 
euro (HRK/€) is essential both for the maintenance of price stability and the stabi-
lity of the domestic banking system. In the same press release it is stressed that the 
monetary and exchange rate policies will remain the same, which is exactly the 
type of policies that, in the given circumstances, can ensure price and ﬁ  nancial 
system stability (CNB, 2011b). From everything mentioned we may assume a 
stabile HRK/€ exchange rate in the baseline scenario, so the effect of the exchange 
rate on public debt change will be negligible.
According to the Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Croatia (2011b), the share 
of public debt denominated in foreign currencies at 30 September 2010 amounted to 
70.7% and we assume an identical share in this analysis at 31 December 2010. On 
the other hand, in baseline projection for the period 2011-15 we assume linear decli-
ne of this share to 50% in 2015. The reason for this assumption may be found in 
Public Debt Management Strategy for the period 2011-13 (Ministry of Finance, 
2011b) in which is predicted the elimination of a part of the currency risk by intro-
ducing hedging instruments (currency swaps), i.e. by substituting the majority of the 
USD-denominated debt by the debt in euro. It has to be noted that risks connected 
to currency risk (primarily with the part denominated in euro) can be partially miti-
gated by a systematic promotion and development of a domestic reference yield 
curve, while in the longer term it can be neutralized by the country’s joining the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. by accepting the euro as a national currency. 
However, although the accession of Croatia to the EU is expected by the end of the 
observed time period in this analysis, we assume that Croatia will not become the 
member of the EMU up to 2015 and therefore it will not eliminate currency risk.
All that is left is the assumption on residual deviations, which we consider to be proba-
bly equal to zero in the baseline scenario in the whole time period. This actually means 
that, except for the already mentioned ﬂ  ows, we do not expect any effect on the change 








































































































































431 5 TESTING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF THE PUBLIC DEBT
Public debt sustainability is deﬁ  ned as a debtor’s ability to fulﬁ  ll his ﬁ  nancial 
obligations to creditors in the long run, with an economically acceptable revenue 
and expenditure balance. If the debt starts to grow faster than the debtor’s ability 
to pay it off, it becomes unsustainable (Mihaljek, 2003). In order to test sustaina-
bility of the public debt upon adverse market cycles, one may use stress tests 
which indicate different scenarios with shocks of one or more key variables that 
lead to deviation from the baseline medium-term projection. In this paper, sustai-
nability of the Croatian public debt will be tested by dynamic analyses with seve-
ral scenarios of the variables from the equation (2) and with shock scenarios of 
variables from the equation (10).
TABLE 4 
Key variables projection and public debt sustainability in the period 2010-15
Optimistic scenario 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP growth (% annually) -1.19 2.22 3.59 4.14 4.35 4.44
Nominal GDP growth (% annually) -0.19 4.98 6.59 7.26 7.48 7.57
Nominal interest rate (% annually) 5.64 5.41 5.19 4.96 4.73 4.50
Primary budget balance (% of GDP) -2.38 -3.08 -2.79 -1.97 -0.85 1.04
Interest expense (% of GDP) 1.99 2.13 2.23 2.27 2.22 2.06
Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.37 -5.20 -5.02 -4.24 -3.07 -1.02
Stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment (% of GDP) 1.98 1.32 1.14 0.40 -0.72 -2.68
Public debt (% of GDP) 41.23 45.80 49.13 50.44 49.27 44.15
Baseline scenario 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP growth (% annually) -1.19 1.09 2.45 3.27 3.76 4.06
Nominal GDP growth (% annually) -0.19 3.81 5.42 6.37 6.88 7.18
Nominal interest rate (% annually) 5.64 5.71 5.79 5.86 5.93 6.00
Primary budget balance (% of GDP) -2.38 -3.08 -2.79 -1.97 -1.23 -0.49
Interest expense (% of GDP) 1.99 2.27 2.64 2.98 3.24 3.42
Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.37 -5.35 -5.43 -4.94 -4.46 -3.92
Stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment (% of GDP) 1.98 2.97 3.05 2.58 2.13 1.60
Public debt (% of GDP) 41.23 48.03 54.03 58.32 61.16 62.58
Pessimistic scenario 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Real GDP growth (% annually) -1.19 -0.05 0.86 1.59 2.17 2.64
Nominal GDP growth (% annually) -0.19 2.65 3.78 4.63 5.23 5.71
Nominal interest rate (% annually) 5.64 6.01 6.39 6.76 7.13 7.50
Primary budget balance (% of GDP) -2.38 -3.08 -2.79 -1.97 -1.98 -5.57
Interest expense (% of GDP) 1.99 2.42 3.09 3.83 4.57 5.41
Budget balance (% of GDP) -4.37 -5.49 -5.88 -5.80 -6.54 -10.98
Stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment (% of GDP) 1.98 4.62 5.00 4.91 5.63 9.86









































































































































432 The deﬁ  ned main three scenarios from the equation (2) are called optimistic, baseline 
and pessimistic and they relate to movements of all key variables from the model in 
the same direction. In other words, the optimistic scenario assumes optimistic move-
ments of all variables, the baseline scenario the expected movements of all variables 
and the pessimistic scenario adverse movements of all variables that impact the cha-
nge of public debt in deﬁ  ned model. Projections of all key variables and public debt 
sustainability testing in given conditions are shown in table 4. 
Only in the case of the optimistic scenario does the public debt stay within the li-
mit prescribed by the Maastricht criterion of 60% of GDP. Especially concerning 
may be the fact that in the deﬁ  ned baseline scenario up to 2015 the share of public 
debt in GDP exceeds that limit, although by only 3 percentage points. The pessi-
mistic scenario predicts an extreme rise in the public debt to 93% of GDP. It is also 
interesting to observe different combinations of the main scenarios, as shown on 
ﬁ  gure 6.
FIGURE 6 
Movements and sustainability of the public debt in different scenarios (% of GDP)
Source: Author’s calculation.
Only two of the total six tested scenarios of key variable combinations fully sati-
sfy the sustainability test in the period up to 2015. These are scenario with optimi-
stic stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment and expected movements of other variables (54.3% of 
GDP in 2015) and scenario with optimistic interest rates and expected movem  ents 
of other variables (57.8% of GDP). The scenario with an optimistic primary bud-
get balance projection and expected movements of other variables and the scena-
rio of a combination of optimistic primary budget balance and stock-ﬂ  ow adjust-
ment and pessimistic nominal interest rates and real GDP growth slightly exceed 
the limit of 60% in 2014 (60.4%, or 60.3% of GDP), while as soon as 2015 the 
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433 The scenario with pessimistic nominal interest rates and the scenario with pessi-
mistic GDP growth rates signiﬁ  cantly exceed the sustainability limit with shares 
in GDP of 67.6%, i.e. 67.1% respectively. 
As well as the above mentioned scenarios of the sustainability of the public debt 
with variables from equation (2), we will test sustainability with shock scenarios 
of variables from equation (10). Babić et al. (2003) use dynamic analysis with ten 
different scenarios for testing the sustainability of the public debt, and these are: 
scenario of the historical averages, “status quo” scenario, 5% scenario, interest 
rate shock scenario, real GDP growth shock scenario, public expenditure shock 
scenario, revenue shock scenario, scenario of combination of moderate shocks, 
depreciation shock scenario and contingent liabilities shock scenario. However, 
since individual shocks almost never occur, in this paper the attention will be 
drawn primarily to different combinations of these shocks. Table 5 shows baseline 
medium-term scenario of dynamic analysis of the public debt sustainability.
In a baseline medium-term scenario, public debt stays below the sustainability li-
mit with a share of 45.8% of GDP in 2015. However, one of the main criticisms of 
the model is deﬁ  nitely the case of relatively high average annual residual in the 
period from 2002 to 2010, amounting to 1.6% of GDP with a standard deviation 
of 1% of GDP. 
For the purpose of testing the sustainability of public debt up to 2015, we deﬁ  ne 
four different scenarios that include historically recorded averages of some varia-
bles and combination of variables shocks. The ﬁ  rst scenario is very similar to the 
baseline scenario from table 5, but projections include historical averages of reco-
gnized liabilities, unidentiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows and nominal exchange rate change in the 
whole period 2011-15. In addition to this scenario, we deﬁ  ne the scenario with 
shocks of recognized liabilities, unidentiﬁ  ed ﬂ  ows and nominal exchange rate 
change as historical averages enlarged by one standard deviation in the whole 
period 2011-15. Furthermore, we assume that the share of public debt denomina-
ted in foreign currencies will be kept at a level of 70% in the whole period.
The third shock scenario predicts the historically recorded average of unidentiﬁ  ed 
ﬂ  ows in the period 2011-15 and shocks of recognized liabilities of the government 
amounting to 10% of GDP in 2011 and 5% in 2012. This scenario also predicts 
constant depreciation shocks of domestic currency (kuna) with regard to euro of 
10% in 2011, 7.5% in 2012, 5% in 2013 and 2.5% in 2014. Furthermore, we assu-
me that the share of the public debt denominated in foreign currencies will be kept 
on a level of 70% in the whole period. Shock of liabilities recognition is deﬁ  ned 
having in mind the constant increase of the share of potential debt in GDP in the 
last few years and the probability of some of the state guarantees being invoked. 
According to the Ministry of Finance (2010) data, at the end of 2010 total potential 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































435 tees and 4.2% of GDP related to HBOR debt6. In the Public Debt Management 
Strategy for the period 2011-13 it is stated that during 2011 expected a takeover of 
some of the guaranteed liabilities according to the plans of shipyards restructuring 
may be expected. As the shipyards restructuring plans are accepted and because of 
their privatization, it can be expected that some of the mentioned potential liabili-
ties will become direct government debt, with new conditions and multi-annual 
maturity of return (Ministry of Finance, 2011b). In Babić et al. (2003) an exchange 
rate shock of 30% was used, which the authors explained with the so-called over-
shooting effect, i.e. the phenomenon that moderate exchange rate corrections (for 
instance a currency devaluation of 10 to 15 percent) often cause strong market 
reaction after which the exchange rate rapidly slides more than would be necessary 
to solve the initial imbalance in the case of stabile conditions. The depreciation 
shock in 2011 that we use in this paper amounts to 10% and it is deﬁ  ned in accor-
dance with shock used by the Croatian National Bank in its analyses of macroeco-
nomic shocks on credit risk of enterprises (CNB, 2011). However, due to potential 
residual shocks arisen from this initial exchange rate shock, in this paper we use 
constant depreciation shocks up to 2014, but with decreasing intensity.
The last shock scenario is based on deﬁ  ned pessimistic real GDP growth and nominal 
interest rate projections from the previous part of the paper. Public debt movements 
in the baseline scenario and four other deﬁ  ned scenarios are shown on ﬁ  gure 7.
FIGURE 7 
Movements and sustainability of the public debt in different scenarios of dynamic 
analysis (% of GDP) 
Source: Author’s calculation.
In the baseline scenario conditions, public debt stays sustainable with the share of 
45.8% of GDP in 2015. Even when the average annual exchange rate, recognized 
6 In line with the Act on the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development (HBOR) (Zakon o Hrvatskoj 
banci za obnovu i razvitak, NN 138/06) the state guarantees all its debts, so that the HBOR debt is often added 
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436 liabilities and residual deviations are added, public debt records the share of 52.5% 
of GDP in 2015. Below the limit of 60% public debt stays also in scenario with 
pessimistic GDP growth and nominal interest rates with the share in GDP of 
58.7%. In the baseline medium-term scenario with historically recorded exchange 
rate, liabilities and residual averages and enlarged by one standard deviation, pu-
blic debt insigniﬁ  cantly exceeds the sustainability limit with a recorded share in 
GDP of 61.1%. Dynamic analysis of public debt sustainability shows the strongest 
sensitivity to combined liabilities and exchange rate shocks with a recorded share 
of 72.8% of GDP in 2015. 
In the Public Debt Management Strategy in Croatia press release, Bajo and Primo-
rac (2011) emphasize deﬁ  ciencies in public debt management related to currency 
structure and potential liabilities. The debt currency structure is still far from op-
timal, since the share of foreign currency debt in total debt was over 70% in Sep-
tember 2010, while a target maximum amounts to 40%. Besides that, public debt 
management strategies have mainly been focused only on direct government lia-
bilities. Including the information on the structure and maturities of government 
guarantees into the strategy would improve the public debt management and re-
duce the risks related to the amount and structure of the debt.
By taking everything mentioned into account, it is clear that public debt sustaina-
bility in the medium-term period highly depends on expectations of the future 
movements of variables that affect the change of public debt. In optimistic scena-
rios Croatian public debt may be mainly considered sustainable, but baseline sce-
narios give us two-sided results. In the model in which we use stock-ﬂ  ow adjust-
ment, public debt in 2015 exceeds the limit of 60%, while in all other baseline 
scenarios it should remain sustainable up to 2015.
Sopek (2010) stresses that the limit of debt to GDP ratio of 60% is probably set too 
high for economies like Croatian, since emerging markets have much smaller 
chances to borrow on international ﬁ  nancial markets, and, due to their generally 
lowest credit ratings, their terms of borrowing are far less favorable than those 
offered to developed countries. This can potentially cause huge problems, since 
the budget deﬁ  cit in Croatia is mainly ﬁ  nanced with new borrowings. In the Croa-
tian Banking Association (2010b) analysis it is stressed that the sustainable ratio 
of public debt to GDP in developing countries is about 20 percentage points lower 
than that in advanced economies and according to several analyses the sustainable 
public debt for countries like Croatia totals between 40% and 50% of GDP. This 
conclusion is additionally conﬁ  rmed by IMF (2003a) research results, according 
to which in 55 percent of the recorded government defaults, public debt was be-
low 60% of GDP in the year before the default, and in 35 percent of the cases the 
default actually occurred at a debt ratio of less than 40% of GDP. Therefore the 









































































































































437 The burden of debt that will be left to future generations is also an important issue 
when considering the optimal public debt level. Future generations will be addi-
tionally burdened with a reform of the pension system and, almost certainly, of the 
health care system. Therefore, unnecessary public debt accumulation needs to be 
avoided. According to Smilaj (2004), the public debt burden will be equitably 
shared between the present and future generations only if it is used for investment 
in development programs which will be for the beneﬁ  t of the future generations, 
too. Otherwise, future generations should be exempted from public debt burden.
6 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In times of crisis public ﬁ  nances are seriously threatened by budget balance desta-
bilization and an increase in indebtedness. The current global ﬁ  nancial crisis 
shows consequences to ﬁ  scal sustainability relatively similar to those of the crises 
recorded in history. Generally, higher public debt has several negative long-term 
economic consequences, like increase in long-term interest rates, limitations on 
room for countercyclical ﬁ  scal policy and lower future economic growth. Moreo-
ver, public debt will be left as a burden to future generations that will have to pay 
off not only the whole amount of the constantly increasing principal, but also the 
interest amounts.
Dynamic analysis results show that public debt may generally be considered su-
stainable in optimistic scenarios. Baseline scenarios give us two-sided results, so 
in the model in which we use stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment, public debt slightly exceeds 
the limit of 60% with the share of 62.6% of GDP in 2015, while in all other base-
line scenarios it remains at levels of 45.8%, or 52.5% of GDP, by which it may be 
considered acceptable. The strongest vulnerability of the Croatian public debt in 
the conducted dynamic analyses can be noted in the parallel shocks of contingent 
liabilities and exchange rate, with a recorded share in GDP of 72.8%. Minor vul-
nerability is registered in the case of real GDP growth and nominal interest rates 
shock.
Hence, from the analysis results we may conclude that sustainability of the Croa-
tian public debt up to 2015 depends highly on future movements of variables that 
affect change in the public debt. We may also conclude that in the observed ﬁ  ve 
years period there are many risks that threat at the sustainability of the Croatian 
public debt and that continuous monitoring and strategic managing of public debt 
should be deﬁ  nitely taken into account. As well as risks that are directly inﬂ  uen-
ced by the ﬁ  scal policy, i.e. future budget balances, there are also some signiﬁ  cant 
indirect risks. Among these risks related to unfavorable currency structure of the 
debt and risks of potential liabilities activation, primarily issued state guarantees, 
should be mentioned without fail. To a lesser extent, but not negligibly, an adverse 
economic situation and an increase in interest rates may also produce risks for the 








































































































































438 This whole analysis should be continuously improved by adding and monitoring 
the variables that are in this analysis considered as given and which could not be 
better analytically examined from the publicly available data. One should deﬁ  ni-
tely try to ﬁ  nd out reasons for relatively high stock-ﬂ  ow adjustment and investi-
gate if the statistics can be improved and how. Improving the accounting recordin-
gs of budgetary operations would deﬁ  nitely lead to better quantiﬁ  cation of the 
public debt movements in the future.
In the Public Debt Management Strategy, baseline public debt projections should 
be explained by an analytical model, and stress testing by the main categories 
elaborated in this paper should be included. Furthermore, there should be an en-
deavour for a better and more transparent recording of all potential liabilities of 
the government by information on issued guarantees, their maturity and level of 
risk should be made publicly available. This may help to manage and mitigate 
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